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1. INTRODUCTION
A social program may achieve great success in one case but not in another, and variation
in a program’s service delivery can also be substantial across different contexts.1 To bet-
ter design policy interventions and make projections for program scale-ups, it is crucial to
understand the factors influencing program effectiveness and study where and how a so-
cial development program will work best (Buera, Kaboski & Shin, 2016; Hanna & Karlan,
2016). Most of the existing studies have focused on incentivizing client households, gener-
ally in the form of modifying project design details such as pricing, targeting, and ways to
deliver service. For example, requiring individual or joint liability in microfinance (Attana-
sio et al., 2015), varying the level of subsidy in bednet provision (Cohen & Dupas, 2010),
providing cash, vouchers or food in food assistance programs (Hidrobo et al., 2014), etc.
Some recent studies have emphasized incentivizing hired agents such as field workers and
teachers instead, by linking compensation with their performance (Glewwe, Ilias & Kremer,
2010; Muralidharan & Sundararaman, 2011; Duflo, Hanna & Ryan, 2012; Ashraf, Bandiera
& Jack, 2014; Cai et al., 2015) and by changing the level of monitoring (Nagavarapu &
Sekhri, 2016). While long being believed to play a crucial role in program delivery, the
incentives for program designers, who decide on the manner in which the program is im-
plemented (e.g. program terms, how to manage and monitor the program, what resources
to put into the program, etc.), are seldom studied empirically due to identification and data
challenges.2
Using a unique government-implemented village fund program in China, this paper is the
first to analyze the effect of the relative timing of a program’s introduction to local (village)
election cycles on a program’s performance and to identify the underlying motivations of
incumbent politicians.3 On the one hand, the launch of the program provides opportuni-
ties for village leaders to engage in undesirable policy distortions for re-election purposes
such as offering loans in exchanges for votes, targeting swing voters and over-lending to
risky borrowers (hereafter referred to generally as “vote-buying” behaviors), leading to over
1For instance, an education-based conditional cash transfer program can raise secondary school atten-
dance rates by as high as 30 percentage points or have no detectable effect at all (García & Saavedra, 2017).
Similar heterogeneity in program performance has also been found for other social interventions such as
health information campaigns (Dupas & Miguel, 2016) and microfinance programs (Banerjee, Karlan & Zin-
man, 2015; Buera, Kaboski & Shin, 2016; Dupas et al., 2018).
2Admittedly, household attributes (e.g. education, wealth, risk attitude, etc.) and local conditions (e.g.
culture, ethnic fragmentation, infrastructure, etc.) are also important factors to account for program perfor-
mance differences. However, these are often difficult to modify and are not the focus of this study.
3Unlike other Chinese government officials who are often appointed by government one level higher,
villagers’ opinion has been largely accounted for in village cadre selection, with anonymous voting becoming
an integral part of the selection process. This feature and the resulting career incentive right before election
at least partially resembles democratic governments
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and/or inefficient use of the funds.4 On the other hand, incumbent village leaders may also
have incentives to better design the program to suit local needs and make greater efforts
in program implementation if they want to demonstrate their competence in the current
position prior to elections (hereafter referred to as “implementing-well” behaviors). Disen-
tangling these two effects has been a great challenge for empirical economists as politicians’
actions are rarely observed.
The village fund program provides an ideal setting for studying variations in service deliv-
ery and their underlying mechanisms. As the central government only provided general
guidelines without specific rules, local village councils had great autonomy regarding pro-
gram design and implementation. Using funds allocated by the central government and
contributed by households in the form of the participation fee (which enables them to bor-
row later), this program provided production loans to poor rural households to improve
their access to credit. In practice, the program was implemented by the village council un-
der the lead of village Party secretary, the most important village figure under the current
Chinese political system.5 Unlike most decentralized programs studied in the literature in
which local governments are only responsible for delivering a “fixed” service designated
by the central government,6 in the actual implementation of the village fund program, vil-
lages are also responsible for service design, such as the composition of management teams,
eligibility criteria, and loan terms, based on local conditions. As a result, there were tremen-
dous variations in program practice across villages, leading to a setting that is analogous to
implementing a credit program separately in different local contexts.
Our study design and data have several unique advantages in analyzing electoral manipu-
lations and distinguishing political incentives. First, we rely on two-year panel data from a
randomized controlled trial (RCT) to causally evaluate the average borrowing performance
of the village fund program in all treatment villages (benchmark). Our studied sample con-
sists of 1351 households from fifty poor rural villages, among which thirty were randomly
selected to roll out the village fund program in 2010. Second, the election cycle varies
considerably across villages for village Party secretaries, who are elected jointly by villagers
and Communist Party members for a tenure of three years. With a careful check of po-
tential determinants of the political cycle and of household and village balances, we argue
that the observed differences in election cycles are largely arbitrary. As the election cycle
was predetermined in each village, the simultaneous launch of the village fund program
4Baland & Robinson (2007) and Khemani (2015), for instances, have shown the association between vote
buying and under-provision of public services.
5The Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committees of the People’s Republic of China insists the “leadership
core” role played by Party branches in village governance. According to O’Brien & Han (2009), village Party
secretaries are usually considered the village “number one,” i.e. the top power holder.
6Therefore, most studies on decentralized service delivery only focus on targeting outcomes.
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in all treatment villages in 2010 created exogenous variation in the relative timing of the
program introduction to the local political cycle and enables us to examine whether such
timing matters for successful service delivery. Third, detailed village and administrative
data allow us to track, phase by phase, the manner in which the program is implemented
in each village, the allocative efficiency and financial sustainability of the funds, and the
investments in other simultaneously implemented projects, all of which are helpful in dis-
tinguishing between the implementing-well story and the vote-buying story.
Using household survey data, we find the program’s impact on borrowing varies greatly
across villages that launched the program at different points in time of their village Party
secretary election cycles. Although on average treatment villages experienced higher like-
lihood of borrowing, households in villages that introduced the program one year before
village Party secretary elections (hereafter referred to as “Before Villages”) were 15.1 per-
centage points more likely to borrow from the fund and were 11.6 percentage points more
likely to borrow from any source, compared with households in post-election treatment
villages (hereafter referred to as “After Villages”). A simple decomposition exercise shows
village Party election cycles can explain 8% of the total cross-village variation in program
take-up rates.
In addition to borrowing outcomes, we also find better performance in “Before Villages”
over a broader range of performance indicators using administrative data extracted from
the village fund monitoring system. In particular, “Before Villages” achieved better target-
ing of the poor, a lower violation rate of the borrowing rules set locally, and a higher official
performance score that ranges between zero and 100. We do not find any significant dif-
ference in terms of default rate and program profitability. These results are inconsistent
with the vote-buying story in which credit opportunities are offered to potentially riskier
borrowers and the program’s financial sustainability is compromised.
A closer examination of the implementation phase by phase shows better program prac-
tices adopted and greater efforts made by the management team in “Before Villages.” In-
terestingly, the initial program participation in the period immediately after information
campaigns, which required financial contribution to the village fund in the form of a par-
ticipation fee, did not differ between “Before” and “After villages,” indicating equally high
demand for the village fund loan on the first impression. This result is inconsistent with the
argument that the better program performance was due to households’ pre-electoral loan
demand changes, indicating the importance of supply factors in achieving performance dif-
ferences. For later implementation phases, while we find no difference in the demographic
composition of fundmanagement committees, the committees in “Before Villages” set lower
interest rates and longer loan lengths. They also attended more management training ses-
3
sions and were more likely to enforce group liability. Program participants were also more
satisfied with the fund committee’s service.
The better implementation of the village fund program in “Before Villages” did not come
at the cost of underinvestment in other projects but appeared to be welfare-improving. In
particular, households in “Before Villages” experienced higher levels of agricultural income,
agricultural productive asset value, and food consumption, compared with households re-
siding in “After Villages.” It is worth noting that some of the above mentioned initial good
practices in program implementation persisted over time, giving rise to possible long-term
benefits. Taken together, these findings provide supporting evidence for the implementing-
well story.
This paper contributes to the extensive literature on delivery of anti-poverty programs in
general, and of credit interventions in particular. As noted by Banerjee, Karlan & Zinman
(2015), credit programs generally have low take-up rates and often lack transformative
impacts. While design elements and local implementation modalities are believed to cause
considerable variation in program performance,7 existing studies have only investigated a
limited set of program details one at a time, including advertising content, interest rate,
and loan maturity for program take-up (Karlan & Zinman, 2008; Bertrand et al., 2010;
Karlan & Zinman, 2018), and joint-liability for food consumption (Attanasio et al., 2015).
Our study is the first to show how political incentives generated by local election cycles
affect multiple features of the loan product supplied that encourage take-up on the part
of households. Moreover, we show that a program implemented by a motivated leader is
more likely to deliver a transformative effect. All these improvements are achieved with
the same budget and general guidelines, and without compromising financial sustainability.
Taken together, our findings highlight the importance of motivating program designers in
the successful delivery of development programs.
Our paper also makes a twofold contribution to the literature on the political cycle. First,
we are the first to empirically distinguish between implementing-well and vote-buying in-
centives, and to show how pre-electoral policy manipulations can be welfare-enhancing.
While both types of incentives can coexist, existing observations of pre-electoral manipula-
tions are generally consistent with the vote-buying story. They lead to no welfare gains and
sometimes can even be detrimental to development (Cole, 2009; Baskaran, Min & Uppal,
2015; Labonne, 2016). One possible explanation for this behavioral and welfare difference
is that previous literature has focused on political cycles at the national or state levels, while
7Program practices are crucial for effective implementation of development programs in general. The
meta analysis of García & Saavedra (2017), for example, have linked variation in program characteristics
with heterogeneity in impact and cost-effectiveness for conditional cash transfer programs.
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we study political cycles at the lowest administrative level (the village). Implementing-well
incentives are likely to be dominant in local elections as local politicians’ efforts as well as
misconduct are more visible to villagers who live close by and, with only earmarked grants
and no tax revenue, their ability to increase spending is limited. Second, unlike tempo-
rary and cyclical manipulations by incumbent politicians documented in previous studies,
we show the possibility that the better implementation of a new program can persist over
time. This difference is a likely result from the fact that our study focuses on the imple-
mentation of a new program, which includes the setting of all initial terms, rather than the
manipulation of an existing policy instrument that is often easy to change and revert. In our
case, some terms of the initial setting of the program may be “sticky” and costly to change
after election, especially for changes unfavorable to farmers such as raising the interest and
shortening the loan length. The persistence in some program practices is important as it
opens up the possibility for sustainable welfare impacts in post-election periods.
In addition, our research connects to a growing literature on the local political determinants
of decentralized development program delivery.8 To improve delivery efficiency, many de-
veloping countries have resorted to decentralized implementation of public projects with-
out devolving of financing authority (Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006a).9
With the potential to curb local capture and enhance accountability, electoral incentives are
widely believed to be important for the effective decentralized delivery of services (World
Bank, 2004; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006a; Mansuri & Rao, 2012). Consistent with the
role of political competition, in their pioneer work on decentralized land reform imple-
mentation in India, Bardhan & Mookherjee (2010) have documented that the likelihood of
carrying out land reform is higher in villages with closer electoral contests and in election
and pre-election years. De Janvry, Finan & Sadoulet (2012) have shown that a decentral-
ized educational conditional cash transfer program in Brazil is more successful in reducing
school dropout rates in municipalities with first-termmayors, who face re-election pressure,
compared with those in their last (second) term. However, these works only focus on the
delivery of the studied programs per se, but do not examine possible costs of these elec-
toral maneuvers such as over and inefficient use of the program fund and underinvestment
in other projects.10 With rich household-level and administrative-level data, our research
complements the literature by addressing these issues, which helps distinguish between
8This is part of a broad literature on the determinants of accountability and capture of local governments.
Bardhan & Mookherjee (2006b) and Bardhan (2016) provide comprehensive reviews of this literature.
9These practices differ from those outlined in the traditional fiscal federalism literature with financial
devolution.
10Camacho & Conover (2011) have documented more extensive manipulation in the implementation of
the Census of the Poor, based on which the household eligibility for national social programs is determined, in
municipalities with more competitive mayor elections. Such manipulation made non-poor households eligible
for subsidies, leading to an increase of the National Health and Social Security budget.
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performing-well and vote-buying incentives, and aids in evaluating comprehensive welfare
implications.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the village fund pro-
gram and village Party selection procedure in China. Section 3 describes the experimental
design, discusses attrition and treatment-control balance, compares key demographic and
socio-economic indicators between villages with different election cycles, and describes
the supplementary administrative data used in this study. The main estimation results on
program performance are provided in Section 4. Section 5 checks the implementation het-
erogeneity in each program phase to explore the underlying mechanisms. Section 6 briefly
discusses welfare effects, and section 7 concludes.
2. PROGRAM AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS
2.1 The program
While China has experienced dramatic economic growth in the last few decades, the growth
is unbalanced across regions, resulting in persistent poverty in some rural areas. As stated in
the government’s 13th Five-Year Plan, China aims to eliminate extreme poverty by 2020. To
achieve this goal, China’s central government has launched a series of poverty-alleviation
programs in targeted poor areas. The village fund program is one such intervention de-
signed by the Chinese State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and Devel-
opment (CPAD) to improve poor rural households’ access to credit.
Lack of formal access to credit has been a chronic issue in rural China, especially for the
rural poor. Prior to the introduction of the village fund program, Rural Credit Cooperatives
(RCCs) were the main formal lending source for rural households. RCCs have been part of
the national banking system since it was transformed from local branches of the People’s
Bank of China (i.e., the current central bank) in the 1950s. While the RCCs aim to support
business and agricultural production, most of the funds are allocated to township and vil-
lage enterprises (TVEs). According to The People’s Bank of China (2012), household loans
only accounted for 34.9% of the overall outstanding loan balance in 2009. Furthermore,
given the goal of profit maximization set during the institutional reform in 2003 and the
requirement of collateral in loan application, the RCCs have largely excluded the poor (Li,
Gan & Hu, 2011; He & Ong, 2014).11
11Based on household data collected in Hubei province, Li, Gan & Hu (2011) show that the failure to meet
the income requirement is the most important self-reported reason for both not applying for RCCs loans and
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In addition to the RCCs, the Chinese government also launched a subsidized loan program
in 1986 as part of its main poverty alleviation strategies over the last thirty years. However,
its focus is on developing rural enterprises and supporting local infrastructure investment.
Therefore, the funds allocated to help individual households are limited. According to an
official report by the Agriculture Department of China’s Ministry of Finance, only 0.7% of
households in targeted areas ever borrowed from the subsidized loan program in 2001,
and this number was even lower for the poor (0.6%).12 In addition to the limited scale,
the household component of the program was unsuccessful as such loans were rarely paid
back. The default rate ranged between 57.3% to 70.4% in 2002-2009.13
The village fund was designed to be a self-sustaining program to meet the loan demand
of those excluded from the formal banking system. It has been the only government-
implemented financial intervention targeting the poorest of the poor. Villages can apply
to set up the fund if they are either on central or provincial governments’ official “poor
villages” list or out of the list but with a net annual income per capita that is lower than
the county mean. Upon approval, the central government invests 150 thousand Yuan to
each village fund with its fiscal budget on poverty alleviation.14 This program’s budget size
is considerable compared to past poverty alleviation projects implemented by the govern-
ment in general (including irrigation, road construction, safe drinking water, etc.), and is
unprecedented for loan interventions in particular. In 2009 (one year prior to the intro-
duction of the village fund program in our study), 50.7% of all poor villages participated
in at least one government poverty-alleviation project. Among participating villages, the
average fiscal budget for development programs was 334 thousand Yuan, of which only 38
thousand Yuan was allocated to subsidized loans.15
In addition to government funding, households also need to contribute to the fund in the
form of a participation fee, which is fully refundable when they quit. Participation is on a
voluntary basis for both poor and non-poor villagers, and a typical entry fee is 200 Yuan.16
It enables households to submit loan applications but does not necessarily lead to actual
borrowing. All participants in a village vote to elect the village fund committee, which then
sets specific management details including loan terms and default penalty.17 According to
loan application rejections.
12Available in Chinese at http://nys.mof.gov.cn/zhengfuxinxi/bgtDiaoCheYanJiu_1_1_1_1_2/200806/
t20080619_47086.html. Accessed on January 14, 2020.
13Source: China Rural Poverty Monitoring Report (2010), CPAD.
14The village fund program in China shares several common features with the Thailand’s Million Baht
Village Fund program studied by Kaboski & Townsend (2012), including the fixed amount of fund for each
village.
15Source: China Rural Poverty Monitoring Report (2010), CPAD.
16This fee can be waived for poor households.
17The village fund committee consists of a management board and a supervisory board. The management
7
the central government’s practice guideline, the village fund lends to individuals within
small groups consisting of five to seven program participants on a rotating basis. Group
members are responsible for each other’s debts. There is no collateral requirement. Loans
are often made discrete and small (1,000-5,000 Yuan each),18 with poor and female par-
ticipants endowed with priority to loan allocation. The guideline also asserts that loans
can only be used for income-generating activities, with a strong emphasis on agricultural
production. However, these suggestions are general and vague, leaving ample room for
local adjustments. According to the guidelines provided in the Decree No.103 [2009] of
the CPAD, villages were required to formulate their own implementation plan according to
local conditions in order to encourage take-up and to ensure program sustainability. As a
result, the actual practice varied considerably across villages.
Following the initial trial conducted by the World Bank in Sichuan and Henan provinces,
the village fund program has spread all over China. By the end of 2009, the Fund had
reached the size of 170 million Yuan. 740,000 households (of which 370,000 were poor
households measured by their income against the national poverty line) in 9,003 villages
from 940 counties had participated in the Fund.19 To understand how the program was
operated locally and to assess the impact of the village fund, the CPAD supported (with
extensive cooperation with local governments) an RCT of this fund in 2010 in villages where
the fund had not been introduced. Eventually, the CPAD aims to expand the program to all
of their listed poor villages as a main policy intervention.
2.2 Election and motivation of village Party secretaries
The village fund program was implemented by the village government under the lead of
the village Party secretary, the most important village official under the current Chinese
political system (Unger, 2002; Bislev & Thøgersen, 2012). They are state agents entitled
to salaries in practice, but not official civil servants on the regular state payroll.20 Unlike
full time officials in higher levels of governments who are often career bureaucrats, village
board is led by a managing director and consists of three to five members including an accountant and a
cashier. They are responsible for the approval, distribution, and recovery of loans under the monitoring
of the supervisory board that is led by the supervisory director and consists three persons. While both the
managing and supervisory directors are core members of the committee, the former has larger influence on
the implementation process and is often considered the head of the village fund committee.
18The size of the loan is considerable compared with the production scale of poor Chinese households.
According to China Rural Poverty Monitoring Report (2010), the average household production expenditure
for the poor was 4,401 Yuan in 2009.
19The the coverage rate of this fund among all government-listed poor villages was 6% in 2009. Later, the
program coverage rate reached 15% in 2013.
20Civil servants are selected via annual national exams or provincial exams. Benefits involved of being a
civil servant are substantial, including security of tenure, relatively high wage, improved welfare benefits, etc.
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Party secretaries are usually part-time cadres and part-time producers, who are local res-
idents actively engaged in farming activities (White, 1992; Zhang, 2018).21 Traditionally,
they were appointed by the government one level above (township) for a tenure of three
years. At the end of their term, reselection decisions are made based on their performance
(Whiting, 2006; Edin, 2003).22 Common performance indicators include industrial perfor-
mance, agricultural output, Party building activities, education, and family planning (Whit-
ing, 2006). Promotions to higher level government positions are rare in China.23
Over the last 15 years, China has adopted a new system (i.e. “two recommendations and
one election”) to augment villages’ input in the selection of Party secretaries. This system
was first introduced by some pioneer regions in the early 2000s (Chen, 2014b).24 In gen-
eral, this procedure has three steps. First, a meeting of Party members proposes a tentative
list of candidates via anonymous nomination. Each village then organizes anonymous vot-
ing, in which all adult residents are eligible to vote. Next, those who win at least 50 percent
of the votes are included in an official list of candidates to be elected by all party members
(Chen, 2014b).25 This new selection procedure was promoted for nationwide implementa-
tion during the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007. Under
the new system, villagers’ evaluations are also important for village Party secretaries’ res-
election. While there are no term limits, the turnover rate for village Party secretaries is
relatively high.26
Benefits of being a village Party secretary include government subsidies and ego rents.
While the level of subsidy is only moderate, it is often supplementary rather than being
the main source of income.27 In fact, most Party secretaries are farmers themselves while
21This feature is not unique to China. Village cadres in many other countries, such as Thailand, Philippines,
and Uganda, also serve on a part-time basis.
22The performance-based reappointment is common for higher levels of governments. Several recent
studies have documented the important role that economic growth plays in promotion for provincial leaders,
e.g. Li & Zhou (2005) and Jia (2017). In addition, the reappointment evaluation is likely based on average
performance, rather than the contemporary year, a fact documented in provincial leaders’ reappointment
practice (Li & Zhou, 2005).
23As pointed it out by Chen (2014b), “it was stipulated that Civil servants must not be selected directly
from among incumbent village cadres.” Even though promotion cases do exist occasionally, they do not follow
a particular timeline but highly depends on availability of vacant positions.
24A better known and studied step for China towards democracy was the introduction of elections for
village head during the village self-governance movement in 1989 (e.g. Zhang et al., 2004; Luo et al., 2007;
Shen & Yao, 2008; Martinez-Bravo et al., 2017). The political system studied in this paper, i.e. “two recom-
mendations and one election,” applies to village Party secretaries.
25According to the Internal Statistical Report of the CPC, around 4% of all rural villagers were members
of the Communist Party of China in 2012.
26According to the 2011 wave data from the nationally representative China Health and Retirement Longi-
tudinal Study (CHARLS), village Party secretaries’ turnover rates for the overall sample and for the restricted
sample consisting only the five provinces covered by our RCT are 24.3% and 25.2%, respectively. These rates
are relatively high compared with the turnover rates for U.S. House members, which is often less than 10%.
27For example, the annual subsidy for village Party secretaries was around 10,200 Yuan in 2013 for Hubei
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serving the village, and the additional source of income makes these positions attractive
for villagers in general. Regardless of improved migration opportunities and rising wages
that are often higher than subsidy incomes, village Party secretaries’ positions are still con-
sidered attractive opportunities as they do not require separation of families and are well
respected by villagers.
How does the local election cycle affect the implementation of the village fund program?
Vote-buying behaviors may exist in the following two forms. First, implementing the pro-
gram prior to election provides incumbents the opportunity to use loan offers in exchange
for votes. Second, according to the political business cycle theories, incumbent politicians
have an incentive to engage in opportunistic pre-electoral manipulation of economic poli-
cies in order to increase their chances of being re-elected (Drazen, 2000).28 The earlier
opportunistic business-cycle theory features irrational voters who give more importance to
the recent past than they do to the distant past, which in turn leads to expansionary policies
and temporary increases in economic activities prior to elections (Nordhaus, 1975). More
recent rational expectation models drop this irrationality assumption but focus on infor-
mation asymmetries about the incumbent leader’s competence instead. As voters believe
competent politicians are able to manipulate economic outcomes more than incompetent
ones, competent politicians want to use electoral policy expansion as a signal to reveal their
type (Rogoff & Sibert, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). In an alternative model with rational voters,
even though incumbents have no information advantage regarding their competency (it is
unknown to everyone instead), they still have incentives to use policy instruments to ap-
pear as competent as possible (Lohmann, 1998). Regardless of differences in model setups,
these models all focus on policy distortions that we categorized generally as vote-buying
behaviors.
Nevertheless, the traditional literature on the political cycle does not consider possible pre-
election changes in incumbents’ effort levels, which can also make the incumbents appear
competent. Admittedly, the implementing-well incentives are likely to be limited or even
absent in national- or state-level elections given that effort levels are hardly observed by
voters, and program visibility is a key determinant of incumbents’ pre-electoral expansion
province, which is 1.15 times of the provincial average net income per capita (CPC’s Hubei Provincial Research
Department, 2015). This compensation is much lower for ultra-poor areas in both absolute and relative terms.
In Mizhi, an ultra-poor country in Shaanxi province, the annual subsidy ranged from 3,700 to 5,100 Yuan in
2010, which was lower than the average annual net income of 5,209 Yuan (Hu & Bai, 2011).
28This theoretical prediction has been empirically tested extensively. The literature includes evidence of
increases in electricity service to election-holding constituencies in India (Baskaran, Min & Uppal, 2015) and
pre-electoral shifts in government spending towards investment in Columbia (Drazen & Eslava, 2010). In
terms of economic performance, Labonne (2016) have documented increases in employment levels in the
two pre-electoral quarters in Philippine.
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decisions.29 However, the implementing-well incentives are arguably greater at the local
level, where politicians’ efforts are more visible through daily interactions with villagers.
Due to the coexistence of both types of incentives, whether a village fund program intro-
duced prior to election achieves better performance is left for empirical investigation.
3. EXPERIMENT, DATA, AND IDENTIFICATION ISSUES
Webegin this section by outlining the experimental design, discussing attrition and treatment-
control balance, and describing the supplementary administrative data used in this study.
We then go on to show the balance of key demographic and socio-economic indicators
across village Party election cycles.
3.1 Experimental design and data
We collaborated with the CPAD to sample and implement an experiment to evaluate the
effectiveness of the village fund. Under the consideration of geographic balance, the sur-
vey team selected 50 ultra-poor villages among areas where it was planned to implement
the village fund program. Sample villages covered Shandong, Henan, Hunan, Gansu, and
Sichuan provinces. The sample covers five out of the eleven ultra-poor cluster areas des-
ignated by the State Council. Among these villages, 30 were randomly selected to imple-
ment the program, while keeping the other 20 villages for control. The general guideline
provided by the State Council requires access to village fund services being restricted to
farmers permanently residing in the program village only, limiting any program spillovers
from treatment to control villages. With the help of local village councils, we made a list
of all households in each village in descending order according to their relative economic
status in the village. We then used systematic sampling to randomly select 30 households
for interview in each village. The baseline survey conducted in August 2010 successfully
interviewed 1500 households.
Immediately upon finishing the baseline survey, the State Council transferred funds to all
treatment villages. Figure A.1 shows a typical timeline of implementation of the village
fund program as suggested by the State Council’s general guideline. This timeline is not
unique to our experiment and is applicable to village fund programs implemented else-
where. We generally divide program activities into four phases. In the preparation phase,
29Consistent with the prediction of Rogoff (1990)’s model, several empirical studies have documented
pre-election expansion in spending on highly visible areas such as transfers and infrastructure investment
(Kneebone & McKenzie, 2001; Gonzalez, 2002; Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya, 2004).
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the village council organizes advertising campaign meetings to publicize the program. Af-
ter the campaign meetings, households can choose whether to participate or not. Next, all
participants elect fund management committee members through anonymous voting. The
elected fund committee members attend management trainings (conducted by the research
team), which cover practice guidelines, accounting practices and usage of the official online
reporting system, and then set specific loan terms based on their local conditions. In the
last phase, participants form borrowing groups on a voluntary basis and decide the order in
which to borrow. Potential borrowers then submit individual loan applications, which will
be reviewed and either approved or rejected by the fund committee. The survey team went
back in July 2012 to conduct a follow-up survey, while the program was still in place.
The attrition rate is relatively low. 1351 out of 1500 (90.1%) baseline households were
repeatedly interviewed in July 2012. To show attrition is not likely to bias our results
reported below, we first regress an attrition dummy on the treatment dummy allowing
errors to be clustered at the village level and find no difference in the likelihood of attrition
between treatment and control villages. In addition, we show attrition households are
similar to the panel households in terms of key outcome indicators in borrowing, income,
and welfare. We report detailed attrition analysis results in Appendix Table A.1.
To check the balance of baseline household characteristics, we regress each of these charac-
teristics on a treatment dummy. As reported in Appendix Table A.2, we do not find statisti-
cally significant differences between treatment and control households in any demographic
and socioeconomic indicators. However, given the limited number of villages included in
our study, we are only able to detect treatment-control differences that are large enough
using the method outlined above (i.e. limited statistical power). Some statistically insignif-
icant differences may be economically significant. For example, treatment villages tend to
have higher agricultural income and a lower value of productive assets. To account for
these economically significant baseline differences, we control for baseline values of out-
comes in relevant post-treatment regression analysis when applicable. In terms of baseline
borrowing behavior, Table A.2 shows a high overall borrowing rate: more than half of
households in our sample reported taking at least one loan since 2009. However most of
these loans were informal without interest, mostly likely to come from friends and relatives.
This fact highlights the lack of formal borrowing opportunities for poor households in rural
China.
In addition to survey data, our analysis also uses administrative village-level program in-
dicators for treated villages. These indicators were extracted in June 2012 from the vil-
lage fund monitoring system managed by CPAD. One concern about using administrative
data is that village politicians have incentives to overreport program performance indica-
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tors and such incentives would be stronger for village Party secretaries in the year before
election. However, the overreporting issue is likely to be mild in our administrative data
given intensive monitoring by higher levels of government. While we cannot fully rule out
the possibility of overreporting, the administrative data provide important supplementary
performance evidence on aspects that are not feasible to study using survey data, such as
targeting the poor, violations of rules set by village fund committees, default behaviors,
financial sustainability of the program, etc.
Although the elected fund committee was in charge of the actual delivery, village Party
secretaries still had significant influence power in the way the program was implemented.
In fact, they served as the head of the fund committee in 24 out of 30 treatment villages,
and as the supervisory director (the second most important figure in the fund committee)
in an additional two villages.30 Many village government officials also played important
roles in the village fund committee, which was formed via anonymous voting. On average,
government officials represented 73% of core members of fund committees, including man-
aging directors (head of village fund) and supervisory directors. The overlap in members
between village government and the village fund committee was not necessarily a result
of manipulation in voting results of the latter, as village government officials were among
the most respected and educated in the villages. This overlap ensures the Party secretaries’
influence over the implementation of the fund even when they themselves were not on the
committee.
3.2 Balance across village Party secretary selection cycles
While the village fund program was simultaneously launched in all treatment villages, the
local election cycle varied across villages. As the year of election is pre-determined in each
village at the time of the introduction of the program, it creates exogenous variation in the
relative timing of the introduction of the village fund program to the election cycle and
enables us to examine whether such timing matters for successful implementation of the
program. Even though the election cycle is unlikely to be changed by the implementation
of the program, we cannot fully rule out this possibility. To avoid the potential problem
of endogenous choice of the election year, we use planned elections to define the relative
timing of the introduction of the program to local political cycles.31,32
30At least one fund committee member was government official in the remaining four villages.
31We calculate the planned election year using total years of tenure of the incumbent village Party secre-
taries by the year of the baseline survey.
32Unfortunately, our data do not have information regarding the timing of the actual election. Thus, we
cannot use planned year as an instrument for the actual election year as in many other political cycle studies.
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Our ability to attribute program performance variations to the local election cycle and its
associated political incentives relies on the crucial assumption that no local factors affect
political cycle and program delivery simultaneously. Otherwise, performance differences
should be attributed to these local factors rather than political cycles. To validate this as-
sumption, we go back in time to examine potential determinants of local political cycles.
According to historical versions of The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, village
Party secretaries served for one-year terms until 1973, when their terms were extended to
two years. The official announcement made by the General Office of the Communist Party
of China on July 6, 1993 further extended their terms to three years.Thus, the village Party
secretary re-selection cycle potentially depends on the following factors: (1) the year of
establishment of the village Party committee, (2) how fast each village followed the term
extension policies, and (3) the existence of unexpected shocks that delay or advance the
re-selection.
First, variations in the establishment year of existing village Party committees can be bro-
ken down into two parts, the initial introduction of Party branches following the founding
of the People’s Republic of China and the formation of new branches later as a result of vil-
lage merging. The former had little influence on the election cycle studied here, as village
Party committees were first established during the period with yearly Party secretaries’ re-
selection.33 The latter, however, may play a role in explaining variations in village election
cycles. To achieve economies of scale, rural China experienced several rounds of village-
merging activities from the 1990s. Small villages were either merged together based on
their proximity, or merged with larger villages nearby.34 As a result, the total number of
administrative villages in China declined from 804,153 in 1991 to 594,658 in 2010. The
single most important criteria in merging decisions is the village population, with no other
rules explicitly specified by the central government.35 Although village merger can affect
the exact years of election, there is no reason to expect it to affect local political cycles in
a systematic way. While the data do not allow us to identify merged villages and directly
test this conjecture, the fact that the number of households are balanced between “Before”
and “After villages,” documented later in this subsection, indicates that political cycles do
not differ between merged and non-merged villages. Nevertheless, we directly control for
33According to the news of the Communist Party of China website, following the establishment
of PRC in 1949, the coverage of village Party branch expanded drastically, reaching 99.9% by 1957.
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/164113/10112555.html. Accessed on January 14, 2020.
34An alternative merging method available for remote and isolated villages is to relocate the entire vil-
lage to merge with another village in more developed areas. Our sample villages did not experience such
relocations as they were still ultra-poor and located in remote areas during the study period.
35We confirm the importance of population size and irrelevance of other factors in the comparison of
characteristics between villages established after 1990 and those established earlier using the CHARLS data.
Among various demographic and socioeconomic factors, we only find difference in the total number of house-
holds (and population), with later established villages being significantly larger (Appendix Table A.3).
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the number of households as a proxy for merged villages in the empirical analysis.
Second, given the general passivity of rural villages in implementing reforms in China noted
by Unger (2002), villages had little control over the timing of term adjustments. One fac-
tor potentially leading to variations in the timing of introducing term extensions is the
bargaining between the central and provincial government.36 However, the province that
study vilalges belong to have no statistical power in explaining variations in election cy-
cles across villages in our sample.37 Therefore, the variation that occurs in village political
cycles is unlikely to be a result of the potential bargaining between central and provincial
governments.
Third, as noted in The Constitution of the Communist Party of China, elections can be
advanced or delayed in special conditions. Anecdotal evidence collected by us points to two
general conditions that warrant the adjustment of re-selection timing. One valid condition
is the coincidence of re-selection with other duties demanding immediate attention, such as
urgent tasks assigned by higher level governments38 or natural disasters, both of which are
out of control of the affected villages. The other condition is the lack of guarantee of a fair
election. Kinship ties are important factors that could influence the election procedures and
outcomes.39 Majority rule can produce dominance of one clan or a struggle between several
clans, both of which are potential causes of election delays. To test if the kinship structure
affects local election cycle in these two ways, we regress the election year separately on
the each of the following two measures of kinship distribution: the share of households
belonging to the largest clan in a village, and whether the largest two kinship clans are
close in size (difference<10% of households). According to results reported in Appendix
Table A.4, kinship ties have little influence on local political cycles. The lack of impact of
kinship ties on election timing is not surprising, as changes in election timing are in fact
uncommon in China. According to additional information collected during our interviews
with Party secretaries of twenty-three ultra-poor villages designated by the State Council
in Guizhou and Sichuan provinces, none of these villages ever experienced advanced or
delayed elections from 2000 to 2019.
Even though we are not able to pin down the exact causes of variations in the election cycle
36Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017), for example, show substantial cross-province variations in introducing
election for village head, another important village official. Within-province implementation was top-down
and rapid.
37We regress election year on province fixed effects and find that the adjusted R-squared is 0 (Table A.4
Row 1). In addition, none of these province dummy variables are statistically significant.
38These tasks are unlikely to be village-specific. For example, a village in Hebei province delayed the
re-selection in June 2018 as it coincided with the re-evaluation of ultra-poor county status in Hebei.
39The role of kinship ties in elections has been discussed by O’Brien & Han (2009) and Martinez-Bravo
et al. (2017).
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across villages due to data constraints, we argue that the observed differences in the elec-
tion cycle at the baseline survey were largely arbitrary. We provide two pieces of supporting
evidence for this hypothesis. First of all, the number of villages that implemented the pro-
gram one year before the election year, during the election year and one year after are
11, 8 and 11, a roughly one-third split. More importantly, we show villages with different
election cycles are not systematically different in terms of demographic composition and so-
cioeconomic conditions. In particular, we test the household balance between villages that
implemented the program one year before or during the election year, and villages that im-
plemented it one year after. We report these test results in Appendix Table A.5. Households
are statistically balanced in terms of these key characteristics in general, except for a higher
fraction of male-headed households and a higher formal borrowing rate in “Before Villages”
than in “After Villages.”40 As the total number of villages is even smaller when restricting to
treatment villages, the previous concern of large minimal detectable size also applies here.
To account for both observed and statistically undetectable baseline differences, we include
baseline values of an outcome in our regression analysis of heterogenous program impact
using 2012 data when applicable.
4. PROGRAM DELIVERY
In this section, we first show the impact of introducing the program before village Party
secretary elections on the household program take-up rate and overall borrowing. We then
proceed to examine if local political cycles affect other program performance indicators
using the village-level administrative data.
4.1 Program take-up and overall borrowing
To better evaluate the relative importance of the local political cycle in successful service
delivery, we first examine the standard average impact of the village fund program and use
the results as a benchmark. Specifically, we estimate the average intent-to-treat parameters
of the following equation:
Yi j = α+ βT j + X j + Zi j + Y
basel ine
i j
+ ei j, (1)
40Note that the number of households did not differ between “Before” and “After villages.” Therefore, these
two types of villages received the same intensity of the credit treatment, calculated as the total fund transfer
amount, which was the same for every village regardless of its size, divided by the number of households in
a village.
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where Y is a borrowing outcome for individual i residing in village j and T is a binary
variable that is 1 if respondent i lives in a village with access to the village fund. We
cluster standard errors at the village level j, the unit of randomization. We include baseline
village and household characteristics, X and Z respectively, to increase the precision of our
estimates. We also control for baseline values of Y when applicable. We focus on delivery
indicators of the actual provision of loans rather than the program’s ultimate welfare effects
as the latter often depend on other conditions outside the governments’ control. We will
return to the discussion of welfare implications in Section 6. As we examine the impact of
the timing of program introduction relative to local political cycles on various borrowing
and welfare indicators, we make the following adjustments for multiple hypothesis testing.
For each table that reports a “family” of indicators (e.g. borrowing), we construct an index
as the average of the z-scores of each indicator within the table. In addition, for each of
these indices, we report the standard p-value as well as the adjusted p-value for multiple
hypothesis testing across the indices based on the stepdown procedure proposed by Romano
& Wolf (2005).
In addition to common village characteristics, the set of village controls also includes pre-
intervention access to credit measured by whether the village is a “credit village,” and the
share of households having been rated as “credit households.” The title “credit village” is
rated by township government according to village management/performance of formal
loan programs, including RCCs and bank loans. A “credit village” receives more formal
loan opportunities with higher loan caps than elsewhere. “Credit households” are rated
by village governments based on their financial status and past repayment history. They
usually enjoy higher chances of being approved for a loan and/or a higher cap of formal
loans than non-credit households. Our household controls include household size and the
age, gender, ethnicity, and literacy of the household head.
As shown in Table A.6, the village fund program had a substantial positive impact on bor-
rowing outcomes. Households in treatment villages were 24.3 percentage points more
likely to take loans from the village fund. Note that 0.7% of households reported borrow-
ing from the program in control villages, suggesting either very limited contamination in
control villages (possible enrollment via relatives or friends in treatment villages) or the
presence of measurement errors (misreporting). While the village fund program crowded
out the demand for informal loans, it still increased the overall households’ borrowing rate.
As shown in Column 2, households in treatment villages were 7.8 percentage points more
likely to take any loan regardless of loan sources. This effect amounted to a 16.4% in-
crease in the likelihood of borrowing, given the average borrowing rate of 47.5% in control
villages.
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Having shown the program’s average impact in the benchmark case, we now turn to the
question of whether such impacts vary with the timing of program introduction relative
to village Party secretary election cycles. For the purpose of the analysis, we restrict our
sample to treatment villages and incorporate political cycle variables into the regression.
We choose this specification in order to be consistent with the regressions used to show the
difference in program implementation later in this paper.41 In particular, we estimate the
following equation:
Yi j = α+ γBe f ore j +δDuring j + X j + Zi j + ei j, (2)
where Be f ore is a binary variable that equals 1 if village j launched the village fund pro-
gram one year before the village Party secretary election; During is a binary variable that
is 1 if village j launched the program in the year of village Party secretary election (here-
after referred to as “During Villages”); and all other notations are the same in Eq. (1).
The coefficient of interest, γ, captures the additional program impact in “Before Villages”
compared with the default group, i.e. “After Villages.” Standard errors are clustered at the
village level.42 In order to address the multiple hypothesis testing issue, we again construct
a borrowing index and report both its standard p-value and p-value adjusted in the same
manner as described for the benchmark case.
We do not focus on the During-After comparison because our data do not allow us to gauge
which event happened first in During Villages, the introduction of the program or the elec-
tion of the Party secretary, even though both took place in the same year. Thus, the mag-
nitude of δ would be difficult to interpret. In addition, even for villages implementing the
program right before the election but still within the same year, it took time to form vil-
lage fund committees, and for committee members to acquire necessary training and to pin
down the way the fund would be run and managed locally. As a result, the first loan was
unlikely to be given out before the election. There is little room for villagers to factor in
the implementation of the village fund program in their voting decisions for village Party
secretaries.
41Unfortunately, an alternative specification that uses all 50 study villages and regress outcomes on a
treatment dummy, political cycle dummies, and the interactions of these two is not feasible as many key
performance indicators are only available for treatment villages.
42One potential concern with our choice of cluster-robust standard errors is that standard asymptotic tests
can over-reject when the number of clusters is not large enough. Nonetheless, according to the simulation
results reported by Cameron, Gelbach & Miller (2008), cluster-robust standard errors performs reasonably
well with 30 clusters. In Appendix Table A.7, we also report results for all within-treatment household regres-
sions (i.e. with 30 village clusters) using a wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure as recommended by Cameron,
Gelbach & Miller (2008) for few clusters. Our results are largely unchanged using this alternative bootstrap
method.
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According to regression results reported in Table 1 Column 1, households in “Before Vil-
lages” were 15.1 percentage points, or a substantial 68.9%, more likely to borrow from the
fund, compared with households in “After Villages” (take-up rate = 21.9%). An investiga-
tion of the reasons for not borrowing among participants indicates more loan applications,
rather than a higher loan approval rate, likely contributes to the improved take-up rate in
“Before Villages.”43 The improved take-up rate was achieved without crowding out bor-
rowing from other sources (Column 3 and 4). As a result, the impact difference on overall
borrowing from any sources was also dramatic: there was an additional 11.6 percentage
points increase in the program’s impact on overall borrowing in “Before Villages.” Intro-
ducing the program prior to election also has a positive and statistically significant impact
on the aggregated borrowing index.
Our results indicate that the timing of program introduction is one of the key determinants
of the take-up rate of the village fund program. We perform a simple decomposition exer-
cise to get an idea of how much of the variation in program take-up rate across villages can
be explained by local political cycles and other local village conditions.44 For each program
village, we estimate the village-specific treatment effect for program take-up rate according
to eq. 1 using households from a particular treatment village and from all twenty control
villages. We then regress the estimated village-specific program take-up rate on the two
political cycle dummies and baseline village characteristics used previously as controls. A
high R-squared of 0.49 shows these variables together can explain almost half of the overall
variation in program take-up rate across all program villages. Next, we perform a Shapley
and Owen decomposition of R-squared to further break down the share of explained vari-
ance into contributions of each characteristic. The two political cycle variables account for
16% of all explained variations, which amounts to 8% of the overall cross-village variations
in program take-up rate. Even though baseline village characteristics, including measures
of village size and pre-intervention development level, explain a remarkable 41% of cross-
village variations in program take-up, they are almost impossible to change in the short
term. Unlike these pre-determined “background” variables, the timing of program intro-
duction and the associated political incentives are relatively easy to adjust by the central
government and can be used to potentially boost program take-up.
43A lack of need for the village loan was the most common reason for program participating households
not to borrow from the village fund (72.22%). Only 0.46% of households reported the reason as application
being rejected by the loan committee, indicating a high approval rate overall.
44We thank Esther Duflo for suggesting this exercise.
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4.2 Other performance indicators
In addition to borrowing outcomes, the administrative data allow us to investigate possible
differences in a broader range of program performance indicators between villages that
introduced the fund program before and after their Party secretary elections. In particular,
for each of the performance indicators discussed below, we estimate the following village-
level regression:
Yj = α+ γBe f ore j +δDuring j + X j + e j. (3)
One important factor in evaluating the performance of such a poverty alleviation program is
how well the program targets the poor. As targeting requires efforts, election pressure may
help the program better meet the poor’s agricultural loan needs. The official definition of
“poor households” set by the National Bureau of Statistics of China in 2011 were “those with
annual expenditure (or income for the ease of data collection) per capita of less than 2,300
Yuan.” However, the local poverty line varies substantially across regions and some areas
impose additional criteria to define “poor households.”45 While we are unable to identify
poor households in our survey sample, the administrative data have information on the
share of loan amount lent to poor households in each program village. As shown in Table
2 Column 1, introducing the program one year before the village Party secretary election
increased the share borrowed by the poor by 31.3 percentage points, which amounts to a
substantial 88% increase comparedwith implementing the program after the election.
In addition to targeting, we also have information on a few other indicators of program
performance: rule violations, loan defaults, and fund profitability. There are three recorded
types of violations: households borrow a new loan to repay old ones; the loan amount is
larger than the cap set by the committee; and households take new loans before paying
back previous ones. Violation rates in “Before Villages” were 29.2 percentage point lower,
which amounted to a reduction of more than 100% compared with “After Villages” (Table 2
Column 2). Compared with the six microfinance studies summarized by Banerjee, Karlan &
Zinman (2015), the default rate of the village fund program was quite low: there were only
12 cases of default out of more than 2,000 loans taken in the two years of implementation.
While take-up rates were much higher in “Before Villages,” they did not experience higher
default rates than “After Villages.” Similarly, we do not find differences in profitability, an
indicator of the financial sustainability of the village fund program.46
45For example, the 2011 poverty line was 4,600 Yuan in Zhejiang province and was 2,665 Yuan in Shaanxi
province. Jiangjin county in Chongqing municipality imposed several additional criteria, including no house
construction or purchase in the last three years and no children study abroad at the households’ own expense.
46Profitability is measured as the total interest income minus management costs, if any, and then is di-
vided by the total funding pool including government transfer and households’ contribution in the form of
participation fees.
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In addition to the individual delivery indicators discussed above, we are able to obtain the
official program performance score, ranging from zero to 100. The evaluation was based on
a comprehensive set of performance dimensions, including program outreach and targeting
(24 points), loan quality (25 points), management efficiency (33 points), and program
financial sustainability (18 points).47 The score was calculated automatically in the fund
monitoring system using pre-determined weights and scoring criteria on these dimensions,
and was directly visible by county-level government officials. The performance score was
also sent to provincial and central governments for record-keeping purposes. As shown in
Table 2 Column 5, “Before Villages” scored 11 points higher than “After Villages,” a result
that is consistent with our findings on separate performance indicators.
Does the better program delivery in “Before Villages” simply reflect vote-buying behaviors?
Neither a higher take-up rate nor better targeting of the poor provides convincing evidence
against this view. In order to secure votes, an incumbent Party secretary may overlend to
ineligible riskier borrowers, leading to a higher rate of program take-up. Similarly, both
theoretical and empirical research has shown that vote buying tends to target the poor (Br-
usco, Nazareno & Stokes, 2004; Stokes, 2005; Blaydes, 2006). As directly pointed out by
Bardhan & Mookherjee (2012), buying votes from the poor with public services may pro-
vide an appearance of successful pro-poor targeting. Nevertheless, vote-buying behaviors,
generally defined as distortive manipulations, are expected to result in inefficient use of the
fund and / or come at the expense of other programs that are of a long-run nature. The lack
of evidence for compromised fund use efficiency measured by default rates and profitability
goes against the vote-buying story. To further pin down the underlying political incentives
for the observed delivery differences, we turn to program implementation details as well
as additional checks including the simultaneous implementation of other programs in the
next section.
5. MECHANISMS
To investigate what drives the divergence in program performance, we focus on program
villages and test potential differences in campaign efforts, characteristics of fund commit-
tee members, committee members’ attendance at training sessions, village fund loan terms,
and households’ evaluation of the program. We will proceed with this analysis by imple-
mentation phases. Empirical specifications adopted are analogous to Eq. 3 for village-level
outcomes and similar to Eq. 2 for household-level indicators. We then discuss possible
alternative contributors to the performance differences, including households’ behavioral
47Source: The evaluation scheme for village fund program. Program internal memo.
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changes prior to elections, buying votes from other Party members, and better / worse
implementation of other simultaneous programs.
5.1 Implementation stages
In the program preparation stage, we check for attendance at campaign meetings and pro-
gram participation. As shown by Bertrand et al. (2010), advertising strategies have the
potential to greatly affect loan take-up. While we do not have detailed information about
how campaign meetings were organized, we use attendance by villagers as a proxy for the
level of effort that Party secretaries put into mobilizing the program. Overall, the program
had reached a large number of households with an average meeting attendance rate of
71%. The high participation rate of 59% in program villages implied a high demand for
credit in these villages. Compared with “After Villages,” households in “Before Villages”
were more likely to attend campaign meetings, suggesting the village council had exerted
more effort into mobilizing and advertising the program. However, this did not translate
into a statistically significant higher program participation rate as shown in Table 3 Column
4. The similar participation rates indicate that households in “Before” and “After Villages”
had equal levels of demand for credit, and were both enthusiastic and interested in borrow-
ing from the village funds when the program was first announced and advertised in 2010.
Therefore, the timing of program introduction, i.e. whether the intervention was launched
before or after village Party secretary elections, was likely to influence program delivery
during later program implementation stages.
In the second phase, all participants elected the committee members for their village funds.
The local political cycle could affect how the committee election was organized, leading to
differences in committee composition between “Before” and “After Villages.” According to
Deserranno, Stryjan & Sulaiman (2019) and Maitra et al. (2020), agent selection procedure
can influence program delivery through its effect on agent types. More specifically, Chat-
topadhyay & Duflo (2004) and Bardhan, Mookherjee & Torrado (2010) have shown that
committee member characteristics such as gender and ethnicity can affect within-village
targeting of public services. Following these studies, we test if the program performance
differences were driven by differences in demographic composition of core village fund
committee members with the largest decision power, including the managing director and
the supervisory director. According to Table 4, the average age of core fund committee
members in “After Villages” was 52. Most of these members (97%) were male and 18.2%
of them were ethnic minorities. The “quality” of the members was measured by the atten-
dance of post-compulsory high school education, and 53% of core members had done so
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in the default group. Regression results show little difference in these committee member
characteristics between “Before” and “After Villages.”
We next focus on training attendance of the elected fund committees and loan terms set by
them. As shown in the first two columns of Table 5, fund committees of “Before Villages”
attended significantly more training sessions conducted by the Renmin University of China
research team in our experiment, regardless of whether we measure training attendance
in person-times or in person-days. The substantial (around 100%) increase in training at-
tendance compared with the control mean suggested the committees made dramatically
greater effort in program implementation. In addition to training, the loan terms set by the
committee may also be different, contributing to the take-up rate variations. As shown in
the last three columns of Table 5, compared with “After Villages,” the annual interest rate
set by the fund committee was 1.42 percentage points lower in “Before Villages,” making
the village fund loan more appealing to potential borrowers given the downward-sloping
loan demand curve.48 A similar difference also existed for loan length: it was 2.06 months
longer in “Before Villages.” Karlan & Zinman (2008), for instance, have shown that longer
loan maturity increases loan demand. For the loan amount cap, we do not find any dif-
ference between “Before” and “After Villages.” In sum, the greater effort made by the fund
committee and the more favorable loan terms in “Before Villages” are potential contributing
factors to the higher loan take-up rates in these villages.
The performance measures for the last phase, loan application and borrowing, are derived
from participants’ responses to questions regarding practices and their subjective rating to
fund committees’ services. According to Table 6, compared with “After Villages,” partici-
pating households in “Before Villages” were more likely to meet other members in their
borrowing groups frequently and be responsible for each other’s loans, a practice promoted
by the central government. They were also more likely to be satisfied with the fund com-
mittees’ service and to rate the loan decision fair, even though the impact on the fairness of
the loan was not statistically significant. Given that the regression sample is limited to par-
ticipants, these results can only be interpreted as suggestive evidence, rather than precise
estimates, of better program practices in “Before Villages.”
To sum up, while there is no significant difference in initial program participation and in the
composition of core fund committee members, the fund committees in “Before villages” set
lower loan interest rates and longer loan lengths. They also attendedmore training sessions,
better followed the group responsibility rule outlined in the State Council’s guidelines, and
48The downward sloping demand curve for loan has been widely documented in the literature in experi-
mental settings (e.g. Karlan & Zinman, 2008; Bertrand et al., 2010; Karlan & Zinman, 2018). Consistent with
Bertrand et al. (2010), we do not find the resulting increase in loan demand is via reduction in the likelihood
of borrowing from other sources.
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provided more satisfactory services. These are important factors that potentially contribute
to the improved program delivery in “Before Villages.” These findings reveal a consistent
pattern of better program practices in multiple implementation phases, providing support
for the implementing-well story.
5.2 Alternative explanations
In addition to incumbents’ incentives, political cycles might also affect households’ financial
behaviors. The possibility that economic uncertainty delays investors’ irreversible invest-
ment decisions has long been documented both theoretically and empirically (e.g. Bernanke,
1983; Romer, 1990; Hassler, 2001). Political events such as elections are an important
source of economic uncertainty. Nevertheless, previous studies only argue for electoral im-
pact on delaying households’ irreversible investments in such items as homes and consumer
durables and their implications do not apply to the decisions to borrow.49 Our empirical
evidence further supports against the argument that the election cycle affects households’
take-up of the village fund. Note that the first financial decision households needed to
make immediately after the announcement of the village fund program was to participate
or not, and program participation required a non-negligible financial commitment in the
form of enrollment fees. If households were to advance/postpone program take-up prior
to the election, we would observe a difference in the initial program participation. How-
ever, as shown earlier in Section 5.1, the program participation rates do not differ between
“Before” and “After Villages.” Therefore, the previously documented difference in program
delivery is unlikely to be a result of households adjusting their financial behaviors prior to
election.
As the current selection procedure for village Party secretaries involves both village-wide
and within-Party elections, candidates not only have incentives to please villages, but also
want to satisfy their fellow Party members. A loosening of lending requirements and an
easing of application procedures for Party members would also result in higher program
take-up and overall borrowing rates in villages with election pressure. However, this effect
is likely to be slight at best, and not dominant. As village Party members are potential
election competitors for the Party secretary position, bribery behaviors are unlikely to exist
on a scale large enough to affect village-level borrowing. In addition, Party members are
generally richer (Morduch & Sicular, 2000). Lending more to Party members indicates
49Riem (2016), for instance, has shown that electoral uncertainty reduces firms’ add-on investments which
face a high degree of irreversibility. Canes-Wrone & Park (2014) further show that uncertainty involved with
election also encourages households to delay home-related investment that are costly-to-undo, leading to a
pre-election decline in housing markets.
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a smaller share borrowed by the poor, which is inconsistent with the better results from
targeting the poor that were found earlier for villages with election pressure.
Another confounding factor is the implementation of other village programs. On the one
hand, in order to gain votes, village Party secretaries would also have an incentive to better
implement other programs in addition to the village fund. These contemporaneous pro-
grams could temporarily boost economic outcomes and affect credit demand. For instance,
agricultural programs, such as those concerning irrigation and land improvement, could
complement the village fund program by increasing agricultural productivity and profitabil-
ity, leading to a more active participation. Therefore, the improved delivery of the village
fund achieved cannot be fully attributed to better implementation of the program itself.
On the other hand, if village government is resource-constrained, an optimal strategy to
ensure being re-elected under the generally defined vote-buying story is to prioritize pro-
grams with immediate and visible impact such as the village fund program and postpone or
marginalize the implementation of other projects with substantial benefits realized in the
future, such as infrastructure construction. In this case, better performance of the village
fund program does not necessarily benefit the villagers as the long-term cost may outweigh
the short-term gain, leading to a net loss.
We provide both qualitative and quantitative evidence to show that political cycles affect
little the implementation of other contemporaneous programs. First of all, expenditures
on these projects are unlikely to be affected as the tax and fee reform (TFR) in 2003 and
the abolishment of agricultural tax (AAT) in 2006 have weakened village finances. Prior
to these reforms, villages used to be fiscally autonomous in financing local public goods.
According to Tsai (2002), village finance covered most of the expenses for local public
service provision, except for specific public projects required by higher level government
and covered by project-specific transfers.50 More specifically, Martinez-Bravo et al. (2017)
have shown that village funding contributed to roughly 70% of expenditure on local public
goods. The TFR and ATT eliminated the key source of village revenue.51 As our sample
consists of ultra-poor villages located in remote regions, they, unlike more developed vil-
lages, had limited opportunities to obtain other sources of income, including revenue from
village enterprises,52 compensation for land requisition by the government as a result of ur-
ban expansion, and rent from collective land leased to investors. As a result, public goods
50Village fund is one such project. Other examples include rebuilding the village school as part of a
drive to eliminate dilapidated school facilities, re-wiring the village’s electrical system, or large-scale inter-
jurisdictional infrastructure projects such as road and dam construction project.
51According to data from a large-scale nationally representative survey, the China Labor Force Dynamics
Survey (CLDS), the fraction of income coming from higher level governments was at least 50% for sample
villages in 2011 and the median fraction was 100%.
52In our sample, the medium village asset value was merely 100,000 Yuan in 2009.
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provision with local funding was nearly impossible for poor villages (Chen, 2014a).53 Fund-
ing for most contemporaneous projects is likely to come from higher levels of government
as part of a larger-scale development plan. The corresponding budget is earmarked for stip-
ulated purposes only and is hard to manipulate. As shown in Appendix Table A.8, we do
not find differences in total expenditures on contemporaneous village projects nor itemized
expenditure on each type of projects between “Before” and “After Villages.”54
Second, pre-electoral (non-expense) manipulation on practical details of other programs is
expected to be mild given the local context. Unlike the trial-stage village fund program,
most other large-scale government development projects were implemented in a standard
top-down manner for decentralized projects with clearly specified guidelines and proce-
dures. Therefore, villages were left with limited adjustment room as to how these programs
were implemented. While we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the election
pressure faced by Party secretaries encouraged them to better implement and manage other
village programs, these changes were probably not large enough to affect borrowing and
welfare outcomes. We support this argument with previously documented evidence that
socio-economic indicators did not differ between “Before” and “After Villages” in 2009 (Ap-
pendix Table A.5). As a result, better performance of the village fund cannot be attributed
to better implementation practices of other village projects prior to election.
Third, the greater effort put into the implementation of the village fund program in “Before
Villages” does not necessarily crowd out time allocated to other village programs given the
part-time nature of the village Party secretary positions with no clearly defined working
hours (i.e. without time constraints).55 Furthermore, as the collection of agricultural tax
used to be the most important task for village government and was largely time-consuming,
the ATT significantly reduced village governments’ workload.56 In a case study of a village
with weak resources, for instance, Li (2008) found the ATT reduced the village govern-
ment’s workload by 42%. Therefore, the better implementation of the village Fund is un-
likely to marginalize the management of other projects and result in negative long-term
53Yang (2011), for instance, has documented that transfer payment was the only source of post-ATT stable
revenue for most villages in Hebei, the amount of which was barely enough to cover village cadres’ salaries
and basic administration expenses. As a result, very little was left to support public goods provision.
54The only exception is energy investment, which is likely to become marginally significant by random
chance (p-value=0.098).
55Instead, village Party secretaries in “Before Villages” likely shorten their time spent on the farm to ac-
commodate the new village fund task.
56As described in Chen (2014a), the remaining tasks include “the enforcement of birth control, taking care
of disabled elders, issuing certificates to applicants for state subsidies, providing connections and informa-
tion to urban job seekers, conflict mediation between villagers, making improvements to irrigation systems
and infrastructure, offering advice on which crops had the greatest market potential, helping big specialized
households and those who aspired to develop family businesses to obtain credit services, building workshops,
selling products, and wooing investors (albeit with little success).”
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consequences for the village economy. Nevertheless, without Party secretaries’ time-use
data, we are unable to completely rule out its possibility.
6. DISCUSSION
Given the improved program implementation and delivery in “Before Villages,” a natu-
ral question is whether such improvements translate into welfare gains. Unlike program
take-up and targeting, welfare outcomes depend on many local factors beyond the gov-
ernment’s control, and therefore are not accurate measures for the quality of village fund
management. Nevertheless, they are still worth exploring, as welfare improvements, or
lack thereof, could help us better distinguish the underlying political incentives. As shown
by Beaman et al. (2014), households’ return to agricultural investments are heterogeneous
and those with higher marginal returns self-select into loan programs. Therefore, if the
higher take-up rate in “Before Villages” was a result of Party secretaries overlending to
farmers with low marginal returns, we would not observe any welfare improvement.
The literature only provides limited evidence linking microcredit access with improved
downstream welfare outcomes, partly due to the lack of statistical power to detect effect
sizes that are economically meaningful (Banerjee, 2013; Banerjee, Karlan & Zinman, 2015).
Given the modest take-up rates, previous studies often generate wide confidence intervals
for intent-to-treat effects. This power issue is especially critical for our study with a limited
sample size. In addition, income and consumption data are prone to measurement error
and reporting biases, which further compromises our statistical power. Therefore, we fo-
cus on both economical and statistical significances in interpreting our estimation results
on welfare outcomes. We will again first show benchmark results on the average program
impact, and then investigate differences between “Before” and “After Villages.”
Table A.9a presents benchmark estimation results on different sources of income. Consis-
tent with the program goal, on average, the village fund program increased agricultural
income by 1,448 Yuan.57 Although the effect is marginally statistically insignificant, it is
economically significant, representing a 29% increase from the control mean. The village
fund program hadmuch smaller effects on wage or business incomes. An interesting pattern
emerges in the analysis of heterogenous impact on income: “Before Villages” experienced
significantly higher agricultural income and lower business income compared with “After
Villages” (Table 7a). This difference suggests borrowers in “Before Villages” were more
likely to use the fund for agricultural production, the main goal of the village fund pro-
57Agricultural income is defined as the total production value minus production costs. This result is con-
sistent with those found by Cai, Park & Wang (2017).
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gram emphasized by the central government. In contrast, households in “After Villages”
tended to use the fund to support business activities. Given that loan rejection is rare in
practice, the difference in loan usage is not due to higher approval rates for agricultural
loans. Instead, heavier emphasis on the agricultural focus of the program in campaigns
(which would attract more loan applications for agricultural purposes) or better monitor-
ing to limit diversion of loan purposes are plausible explanations for this difference.
Results on asset ownership and food consumption are consistent with the pattern found for
agricultural income. As shown in Table A.9b, the program significantly increased the value
of productive assets owned by households in treatment villages. However, most of the new
investments were in assets not directly related to agriculture such as automobiles. As a
result, the program only had a small positive impact on the value of assets closely related
to agricultural production that we are unable to detect statistically. The average impacts
on the value of consumer durables and food consumption per capital over the last two
weeks were alsominimal. A closer comparison between “Before” and “After Villages” reveals
considerable impact differences (Table 7b). While there was no noticeable difference in the
total value of productive assets, the value of assets directly related to agricultural production
was 61% higher in “Before Villages.” Food consumption per capita over the last two weeks
was also significantly higher in these villages. These results are consistent with the previous
evidence of increased agricultural income in “Before Villages,” reinforcing the fact that
fund committees in these villages were more likely to use the fund to support agricultural
production following the central government’s guideline.
In sum, we find introducing the village fund prior to local elections leads to improved pro-
gram delivery and enhanced welfare impacts. These findings are in sharp contrast with ex-
isting studies on political cycles, which often show pre-electoral manipulations do not have
a positive effect on welfare and can be detrimental to development (Cole, 2009; Baskaran,
Min & Uppal, 2015; Labonne, 2016). For instance, in a similar context of agricultural credit
provision, Cole (2009) has shown an increase in agricultural credit offered by government-
owned banks in the year prior to an election or an election year. Unlike our findings of
unchanged default rates and enhanced agricultural production, the credit boom found by
Cole (2009) leads to increases in default and no significant changes in agricultural out-
put.
Electoral pressure can lead to more successful program performance in our study for the
following two reasons. First, our study focuses on the implementation of a new program,
which includes setting all initial terms, rather thanmanipulation of an existing policy instru-
ment that is often easy to change and revert. As noticed by Baskaran, Min & Uppal (2015),
manipulation may persist if there are costs to reversing the pre-election increase. In our
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case, some terms of the initial setting of the program may be “sticky” and costly to change
after the election, leading to some persistence instead of purely cyclical changes over time.
In addition, the cost can be even greater for changes unfavorable to farmers, such as rais-
ing interest and shortening loan length that Party secretaries in “Before Villages” may find
appealing to do post-election. Karlan & Zinman (2008) and Karlan & Zinman (2018), for
example, have shown that loan demand is more elastic for increases than for decreases in
interest. As pointed out by Karlan & Zinman (2008), the more elastic demand for price
increases than for decreases is consistent with both the predictions of the prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), in which past experience serves
as a reference point and consumers value loss more heavily than gains, and models with
transaction utilities (Thaler, 1985, 1999), in which consumers perceive the price increase
as unfair.
To test the conjecture that the initial favorable practices can persist over time, we examine
differences in loan terms between “Before” and “After Villages” in 2014. We find “Before
Villages” had a lower fund annual interest rate and a longer loan length in 2014 compared
with “After Villages.” Both effects are statistically significant at the 5% level.58 Unlike
the temporary and cyclical policy manipulations by incumbent politicians documented in
previous studies,59 the persistence of (at least some) good program practices opens up the
possibility for welfare improvements.
Second, the level of election and the corresponding political context in our study differ from
the existing political cycle studies. While previous works focus on political cycles at the na-
tional or state levels, we study political cycles at the lowest administrative level (the village).
Implementing-well incentives are likely dominant in local elections as politicians’ efforts as
well as their misconduct are more visible to villagers who live close by. Moreover, existing
observations of pre-electoral fiscal expansions in certain areas are often compensated with
contractions in other areas or in post-election periods. Similar fiscal manipulations are not
feasible for Party secretaries as village governments have no power to collect tax revenue
and development projects are financed solely by earmarked grants. In addition, the inten-
sive monitoring from higher levels of government is also likely to play an important role in
discouraging inefficient program manipulations. All of these contextual features limit vote-
buying opportunities and encourage Party secretaries to perform well and better implement
the program.
58The point estimates (standard errors) are 1.47 (0.66) and 2.72 (1.12) for interest rate and loan length,
respectively.
59The only exception is Baskaran, Min & Uppal (2015), who have shown persistently higher electricity
supply in the post-election period.
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7. CONCLUSION
This paper shows better delivery of the government-implemented village fund program in
China when introduced in the year prior to local Party secretary elections. These include,
among others, a higher program take-up rate, better targeting of the poor, and fewer rule
violations. The enhanced delivery further leads to increased agricultural income and food
consumption.
The improved performance was achieved with similar participation rates of households in
the initial stage of the program and comparable demographic compositions of core mem-
bers in the village fund committees. Instead, choosing more favorable loan terms, attending
more training sessions, and better following the practice guideline set by the central govern-
ment are plausible contributing factors to the enhanced program impact in these villages.
Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that local incumbents have incentives to
better implement the program, rather than misuse the service in exchange for votes, under
election pressure.
While the results are specific to the local program context in China, they do indicate that
political incentives can perhaps improve program performance in other similar contexts as
well. An important feature of the village fund program is its decentralized implementation
with earmarked grants. This feature both enables local control of the program implementa-
tion and prevents manipulation of budgets earmarked for other projects. The decentralized
implementation of public projects is common in developing countries aiming for improved
delivery efficiency. Similar to China, local governments in many other Asian, African and
Latin American countries often lack the power to collect tax and rely on transfers from
higher levels of government to implement designated public projects.
Note that the possibility for local politicians’ electoral incentives to help a program achieve
improved delivery and enhanced welfare is not guaranteed without other, carefully de-
signed, practices. In the village fund program setting, these practices include, but are not
limited to, intensive monitoring, which further helps prevent vote buying, and decentral-
ized design of service features that are costly to change after the election. Nevertheless, by
demonstrating a case of enhanced program performance with motivated leaders, our results
highlight the role of electoral incentives, or incentives of program designers in general, in
successful social program delivery. These incentives are equally important, if not more so,
than motivating hired agents and client households in policy design.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Before 0.151** 0.116** -0.016 0.010 0.139**
(0.062) (0.045) (0.017) (0.057) (0.056)
During -0.021 0.041 -0.018 0.042
(0.070) (0.049) (0.022) (0.083)
Base group mean 0.219 0.522 0.054 0.366 0.000
N 780 803 803 803 803
Romano-Wolf p-value 0.000
Note: Table reports additional program impact on borrowing in villages that introduced the program before
(or during) the village Party secretary election year, compared with those that introduced the program after
the election year. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significant
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Before 0.313** -0.292*** 0.004 -0.007 11.06*
(0.149) (0.100) (0.015) (0.010) (6.051)
During 0.025 -0.166 0.024 0.005 -2.852
(0.164) (0.110) (0.016) (0.011) (6.640)
Base group mean 0.355 0.272 0 0.026 59.56
N 30 30 30 30 30
Note: Table reports additional program impact on official program performance indicators in villages
that introduced the program before (or during) the village Party secretary election year, compared with
those that introduced the program after the election year. Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significant levels
of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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Before 0.139* 0.802** 0.094
(0.078) (0.374) (0.083)
During -0.105 -0.137 -0.109
(0.100) (0.362) (0.100)
Base group mean 0.704 1.858 0.598
N 705 703 766
Note: Table reports additional program impact on campaign meeting attendance and participa-
tion in villages that introduced the program before (or during) the village Party secretary election
year, compared with those that introduced the program after the election year. Standard errors
are clustered at the village level. Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significant levels of 10%, 5%,
and 1% respectively.







(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before 0.292 -0.086 -0.117 -0.141
(2.390) (0.071) (0.153) (0.172)
During 0.713 0.010 0.165 -0.022
(2.622) (0.078) (0.167) (0.188)
Base group mean 52.14 0.970 0.182 0.530
N 30 30 30 30
Note: Table reports differences in demographic composition of the fund committee between villages
that introduced the program before (or during) the village Party secretary election year and those that
introduced the program after the election year. Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significant levels of 10%,
5%, and 1% respectively.
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Table 5: Loan Committee Training Attendance and Loan Terms














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Before 10.99*** 20.13* -1.424* 2.057** -0.275
(3.481) (10.85) (0.731) (0.827) (0.573)
During -2.037 -2.510 -0.403 0.057 -0.304
(3.820) (11.90) (0.802) (0.907) (0.628)
Base group mean 9.636 20.18 10.58 10.36 5.273
N 30 30 30 30 30
Note: Table reports additional program impact on loan terms in villages that introduced the program
before (or during) the village Party secretary election year, compared with those that introduced the
program after the election year. Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.












(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before 0.187* 0.078* 0.076** 0.035
(0.102) (0.041) (0.036) (0.023)
During 0.055 0.042 0.055 0.040
(0.123) (0.042) (0.037) (0.024)
Base group mean 0.368 0.907 0.910 0.961
N 344 349 441 431
Note: Table reports differences in participants’ program evaluations between villages that introduced
the program before (or during) the village Party secretary election year and those that introduced the
program after the election year. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before 2.252* -0.677 -2.358** 0.026
(1.234) (1.324) (0.892) (0.094)
During 0.034 0.065 -1.536
(0.799) (2.013) (0.740)
Base group mean 5.018 11.69 3.424 0.000
N 803 803 803 803
Romano-Wolf p-value 0.882













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Before -0.999 0.211 0.472* 22.54** 0.123*
(0.723) (1.416) (0.232) (10.45) (0.064)
During -0.198 -1.342 -0.002 -4.576
(0.763) (1.229) (0.395) (10.02)
Base group mean 5.080 4.064 0.779 89.90 0.000




Note: Table reports additional program impact on welfare indicators in villages that introduced the pro-
gram before (or during) the village Party secretary election year, compared with those that introduced
the program after the election year. Incomes and values of assets are measured in 1000 Yuan. Standard




Figure A.1: Program Implementation Timeline
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(b) Balance of key indicators between attrition and non-attrition households
Non-attrition Attrition - Non-attrition
Mean SD Coeff. p-value N
Access to credit
Any type of loan 0.585 0.493 -0.048 0.334 1500
Formal loan 0.118 0.322 -0.004 0.892 1500
Informal loan 0.531 0.499 -0.042 0.407 1500
Income sources (1,000 RMB)
Agriculture income 3.169 9.721 -0.664 0.120 1500
Wage income 10.27 14.61 0.531 0.671 1500
Business income 1.139 11.72 1.146 0.365 1500
Assets and food consumption
Consumer durables (1,000 RMB) 3.981 5.560 -0.054 0.925 1499
Productive assets (1,000 RMB) 3.088 20.72 -0.812 0.420 1427
- of which closely related to ag. 0.741 1.955 -0.075 0.543 1427
Food cons. per capita (RMB) 78.52 56.00 -0.203 0.958 1498
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Table A.2: Treatment-Control Balance
Control Treatment-Control
N N Mean SD Coeff. p-value
Household demographics
Head age 1344 539 51.9 11.4 0.648 0.620
Head male 1344 539 0.941 0.237 0.011 0.497
Head illiteracy 1340 537 0.179 0.384 0.001 0.988
Head ethnic minority 1344 539 0.174 0.380 0.001 0.994
Household size 1351 541 4.31 1.53 -0.111 0.586
# of children (age<16) 1351 541 0.815 0.886 -0.039 0.705
# of adults (16≤age<60) 1351 541 2.81 1.38 -0.089 0.528
# of elderly (age≥60) 1351 541 0.688 0.863 0.017 0.841
# of male 1351 541 2.27 0.956 -0.055 0.654
Access to credit
Any type of loan 1351 541 0.558 0.497 0.044 0.369
Formal loan 1351 541 0.109 0.312 0.014 0.521
Informal loan 1351 541 0.508 0.500 0.039 0.493
Income sources (1,000 RMB)
Agriculture income 1351 541 2.74 8.71 0.717 0.355
Wage income 1351 541 11.9 16.3 -2.65 0.129
Business income 1351 541 1.53 16.1 -0.656 0.217
Assets and food consumption
Consumer durables (1,000 RMB) 1350 541 4.41 6.09 -0.711 0.230
Productive assets (1,000 RMB) 1286 510 4.31 29.8 -2.03 0.217
- of which closely related to ag. 1286 510 0.716 1.94 0.041 0.792
Food cons. per capita (RMB) 1349 541 82.3 64.8 -6.39 0.357
Other socioeconomic indicators
# of members with disability or
chronic illness
1351 541 1.01 1.08 0.094 0.439
Distance to bank (km) 1350 541 4.36 3.72 0.824 0.404
Distance to hospital (km) 1338 533 1.07 1.62 0.013 0.965
Distance to town (km) 1350 541 27.1 12.8 4.06 0.339
Village characteristics
# of Households 50 20 268 165 16.9 0.671
Categorized as credit village 50 20 0.550 0.510 0.017 0.910
% of credit HHs 50 20 0.308 0.309 -0.069 0.435
% of HHs with sanitary latrine 50 20 0.170 0.178 -0.011 0.859
% of HHs with phone 50 20 0.784 0.197 -0.059 0.343
43
Table A.3: Village Characteristics by Year of Establishment (CHARLS data)
Before 1990 After-Before
N N Mean SD Coeff. p-value
Demographics
Population (1000s) 293 204 1.97 1.44 1.03 0.000***
# of households 293 204 566 437 223 0.000***
Ethnic minorities (dummy) 293 204 0.426 0.496 0.000 0.994
Village economy
Net per-capita income (1000s) 280 196 4.27 4.80 -0.022 0.971
% of HHs with formal credit 269 192 0.141 0.192 -0.012 0.636
Enterprise in village (dummy) 291 202 0.460 0.500 0.034 0.594
Infrastructure
Access to paved road (dummy) 293 204 0.583 0.494 .035 0.580
Hospital (dummy) 293 204 0.779 0.416 0.075 0.142
Kindergarten (dummy) 293 204 0.426 0.496 0.034 0.589
Primary school (dummy) 293 204 0.574 0.496 0.101 0.106
Junior high school (dummy) 293 204 0.103 0.305 0.021 0.604
Senior high school (dummy) 293 204 0.025 0.155 -0.013 0.462
Bank branch (dummy) 293 204 0.127 0.334 0.030 0.495
Supermarket (dummy) 293 204 0.225 0.419 0.044 0.417
Nursing home (dummy) 293 204 0.103 0.305 -0.013 0.732
% of HHs with cellphone 293 204 0.866 0.160 0.020 0.318
Note: Table shows differences in characteristics between villages established on or after 1990 and those
established before 1990 using the CHARLS data.
Table A.4: Contributing Factors to Local Political Cycle Variations
Dependent Variable: Election Year Coef. Obs. Adj R-sq
Province Fixed Effects – 30 -0.00
Faction of household with the largest kinship ties -0.026 30 -0.04
(0.763)
Largest two kinship clans close in size -0.205 30 -0.02
(difference<10% of HH) (0.335)
Note: We assign values of 0, 1 and 2 for the election year variable to villages with (planned) elections
in 2010, 2011 and 2012 respectively.
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Table A.5: Balance across Villages in Different Political Cycles
Program Implementation Relative to
Village Secretary Reappointment Year
Before - After During - After
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Household demographics
Head age 0.115 0.957 0.223 0.899
Head male 0.041 0.017** 0.018 0.470
Head illiteracy -0.068 0.296 -0.018 0.705
Head ethnic minority 0.021 0.885 0.088 0.623
Household size 0.129 0.710 0.091 0.795
# of children (age<16) -0.031 0.873 -0.045 0.806
# of adults (16≤age<60) 0.017 0.947 0.115 0.622
# of elderly (age≥60) 0.142 0.255 0.021 0.855
# of male 0.071 0.726 0.085 0.705
Access to credit
Any type of loan -0.064 0.318 -0.054 0.493
Formal loan 0.051 0.080* 0.012 0.773
Informal loan -0.095 0.192 -0.068 0.451
Income sources (1,000 RMB)
Agriculture income 1.86 0.157 0.010 0.989
Wage income -2.57 0.271 -4.05 0.099*
Business income -0.939 0.185 -0.417 0.526
Assets and food consumption (RMB)
Consumer durables (1,000) -0.266 0.763 -0.721 0.472
Productive assets (1,000) -0.579 0.667 -1.82 0.101
- of which closely related to ag. 0.198 0.253 0.081 0.760
Food cons. per capita -0.457 0.958 0.497 0.965
Other socioeconomic indicators
# of members with disability or
chronic illness
0.041 0.854 0.066 0.754
Distance to bank (km) 0.005 0.997 -1.66 0.347
Distance to hospital (km) 0.419 0.268 -0.155 0.554
Distance to town (km) 7.87 0.240 3.06 0.726
Village characteristics
# of Households -44.7 0.378 -4.61 0.933
Categorized as credit village 0.000 1.000 -0.261 0.278
% of credit HHs 0.087 0.510 0.038 0.789
% of HHs with sanitary latrine 0.072 0.490 0.008 0.943
% of HHs with phone 0.058 0.529 -0.143 0.163
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated villages 0.243*** 0.078** -0.017 -0.062* 0.712***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.012) (0.033) (0.100)
Base group mean 0.007 0.475 0.081 0.416 0.000
N 1317 1340 1340 1340 1340
Romano-Wolf p-value 0.000
Note: Table reports the average program impact on borrowing in treatment villages (benchmark). Standard
errors are clustered at the village level. Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%
respectively.
Table A.7: Wild Cluster Bootstrap-t Method for Within-treatment Specifications
Before - After During - After
Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Program take-up and overall borrowing
Village fund loan 0.151 0.020 -0.021 0.828
Any loan 0.116 0.072 0.041 0.536
Formal loan -0.016 0.448 -0.018 0.548
Informal loan 0.010 0.832 0.042 0.720
Advertisement and participation
Camp. meeting Attendance 0.139 0.168 -0.105 0.456
No. of camp. Meetings Attended 0.802 0.056 -0.137 0.728
Program participation 0.094 0.348 -0.109 0.356
Income
Agriculture income 2.252 0.096 0.034 1.000
Wage income -0.677 0.648 0.065 0.968
Business income -2.358 0.052 -1.536 0.088
Assets and food consumption (RMB)
Consumer durables (1,000) -0.999 0.256 -0.198 0.880
Productive assets (1,000) 0.211 0.884 -1.342 0.380
- of which closely related to ag. 0.472 0.088 -0.002 0.912
Food cons. per capita 22.54 0.088 -4.576 1.000
Note: P-values are calculated using a wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure with 500 repetitions.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Before 20.44 30.28 -7.207 4.176∗ -5.917 10.73 8.164 -22.82 -0.563
(88.44) (42.54) (8.687) (2.395) (6.161) (14.86) (50.49) (17.32) (0.494)
During -21.86 -11.31 -10.17 -1.040 -0.996 9.402 6.508 -8.618 0.277
(100.4) (48.30) ( 9.862) (2.719) (6.994) (16.87) (57.32) (19.66) (0.561)
Note: Table reports village project expenditure differences between villages that introduced the program before (or during) the village
Party secretary election year and those that introduced the program after the election year during the two-year implementation of the
village fund program, 2010 and 2011. The first column reports total expenditure differences, including the nine specified project types
and all other unspecified projects. Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.47









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated villages 1.448 0.526 -0.055 0.047
(0.926) (1.015) (0.685) (0.052)
Base group mean 5.023 11.00 2.577 0.000
N 1340 1340 1340 1340
Romano-Wolf p-value 0.353













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treated villages 0.188 1.757** 0.207 4.271 0.046
(0.455) (0.762) (0.180) (7.140) (0.041)
Base group mean 4.580 3.877 0.882 92.82 0.000




Note: Table reports the average program impact on income and welfare in treatment villages (bench-
mark). Incomes and values of assets are measured in 1,000 Yuan. Standard errors are clustered at the
village level. Asterisks ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
48
